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Jessica Lunsford’s father awoke on
February 24, 2005 to discover his nine-year-old
daughter was missing. John Couey, Jessica’s
neighbor, had entered their home at 1:00 AM
the previous night and abducted the little girl.
After sexually assaulting her, he dug a hole and
buried her alive. A forty-nine-year-old
homeless man, Brian Mitchell, abducted
fifteen-year-old Elizabeth Smart at knifepoint
from her bedroom in an affluent district of Salt
Lake City. She was found after nine months of
sexual abuse, deprivation, and threats to her
life. The scruffy drifter was arrested and awaits
trial.
In recent months, newscasters have
brought the images of these unshaven, dirty
predators and their fair, sweet victims into our
households. Now imagine that these predators
are attractive young women in business suits
and heels and their victims are rowdy little boys
in baggy clothes. Impossible? Perhaps most
people think so. Why is it that we envision the
prototypical child molester as one of the men
represented above? Why is that we envision the
prototypical sexual abuse victim as a fragile
little girl?

Child Sexual Abuse
Child sexual abuse is a heinous act
endured by 100,000 to 500,000 children in
the United States every year (Maes &
Baum, 2001). Child sexual abuse is defined
as any act on an individual 18 years or
younger by an adult that includes, but is not
limited to, attempted and or completed
intercourse, inappropriate touching or
kissing, photographing a child sexually, or
by exhibiting sexual body parts to a child
(Fieldman & Crespi, 2002). The prevalence
of cases of child sexual abuse varies to
some degree because individuals define
sexual abuse differently. Consequently,
some instances of child sexual abuse may
not be identified because the victims did not
consider the behaviors perpetrated upon
them to be abusive and interviewers’
questions were not specific enough (e.g.,
about a behavior) to eliminate interpretation
(Finkelhor, Hotaling, Lewis & Smith,
1990).
Child sexual abuse has many
consequences for those children involved.
One of the most common consequences is
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
including symptoms such as hypervigilance,
sleep disturbances, flashbacks, and
restricted affect (Kendall-Tackett, Williams,
& Finkelhor, 1993). In addition to
symptoms of PTSD, children show
withdrawn behavior, self-injurious
behavior, and age inappropriate sexual
knowledge and behavior (Kendall-Tackett
et al., 1993). These consequences are more
prevalent in some age groups than in other
age groups. PTSD is the most common
consequence for pre-school age children.
Fear, nightmares, and school issues are the
most common consequences for school age
children. Depression and suicidal or selfinjurious behavior are the most common
consequences for adolescents (KendallTackett et al., 1993). More severe forms of
sexual abuse, such as incidents that include
penetration, tend to be extremely damaging
to a child and extremely likely to be
associated with psychopathology (KendallTackett et al., 1993).

Severity of child sexual victimization is
defined by three primary characteristics
(Kendall-Tackett et al., 1993). First, instances
in which a child is penetrated vaginally or
anally are considered more severe than are
instances in which there is no penetration.
Second, instances in which the perpetrator is
psychologically and socially close to a child are
more severe than are instances in which the
perpetrator is not psychologically and socially
close to a child. Third, instances in which force
or threat of force is used are more severe than
are instances in which force or threat of force is
absent. Consequently, the severity of child
sexual victimization may range from least
severe (e.g., a child is coerced into letting an
adult neighbor see her naked) to most severe
(e.g., a child is forcibly sodomized by his stepfather who threatens to kill him if he tells
anyone). Victims of longer durations of sexual
abuse also tend to have more consequences
(Kendall-Tackett et al., 1993).
In addition to the previously mentioned
psychopathology, victims of child sexual abuse
are more likely to become perpetrators of child
sexual abuse than are individuals with no
history of child sexual victimization. Wilcox,
Richards and O’Keeffe (2004), for example,
noted that 72% of sexually aggressive preteenage children had themselves been sexually
abused. Researchers have found that 75% of
females who are sexually abusive were sexually
abused as children (Wilcox et al., 2004).
Researchers have also found that 40% of males
who are sexually abusive were sexually abused
as children (Wilcox et al., 2004). Perpetrators
who sexually victimize children are more likely
to have been abused themselves than are
perpetrators who sexually victimize adults
(Wilcox et al., 2004). Transmission of sexually
abusive behavior from one generation to the
next is not, however, an inevitable consequence
of being sexually abused (Cicchetti & Rizley,
1981).
There are many misconceptions about
who perpetrates child sexual abuse. One general
belief is that males are nearly always
perpetrators (Maynard & Wiederman, 1997). A
belief that males will most often perpetrate may
result in a lack of response from outsiders when

a female perpetrates (Maynard &
Wiederman, 1997). Another general belief
is that victims are nearly always girls. A
belief that girls will most often be victims
may result in a lack of response from
outsiders when a boy is victimized
(Maynard & Wiederman, 1997). College
students, for example, tend to believe that
when a male child and female adult interact
sexually, the interaction is not child abuse
(Denov, 2003; Maynard & Wiederman,
1997). College students reported that they
believed that a male child is not scarred by a
sexual encounter with a female adult
(Maynard & Wiederman, 1997). In general,
college students rated same sex sexual
interactions to be sexual abuse more than
they rated opposite-sex sexual interactions
to be sexual abuse (Maynard & Wiederman,
1997).
Individuals also tend to believe that
females do not possess the potential to be
sexually aggressive (Denov, 2003).
Clinicians perpetuate this belief when they
report female sexual aggression as rare
(Denov, 2003). In fact, it is written in
several state laws that a female cannot
commit an act of rape (Denov, 2003).
Idaho’s statute on rape, for example, reads
“rape is defined as the penetration, however
slight, of the oral, anal or vaginal opening
with the perpetrator’s penis …” (Denov,
2003, p. 309). Given that a woman does not
have a penis, it is virtually impossible for a
woman to be charged with rape even if she
has sex forcibly or if she penetrates her
victim’s orifices with an object. As a result
of these beliefs and laws, victims are fearful
of reporting sexual abuse perpetrated by a
female because victims feel that they are
less likely to be believed or protected
(Denov, 2003).
Although perpetrators may be male
or female, perpetrators do tend to differ in
terms of their relationship to a victim.
Individuals known to a victim (e.g.,
biological relatives, family friends, and
adults living in the female victim’s home)
are most often perpetrators in cases where
penetration takes place with a female victim

(Carlstedt, Forsman & Soderstrom, 2001;
Finkelor et. al., 1990). Individuals unknown to
a victim (e.g., a neighbor, a bus driver, and a
total stranger) are most often perpetrators in
cases where penetration takes place with a male
victim (Caelstedt et al., 2001; Finkelor et al.,
1990). The older a child is, the more likely it is
for a perpetrator to be a stranger (Caelstedt et
al., 2001).
Females play an important role as
perpetrators. The general public often likes to
deny that females are also perpetrators of child
sexual abuse (Denov, 2003). In a study of 348
convicted male rapists, 106 of these men had
been victims of child sexual trauma (Denov,
2003). Of these 106 inmates, 42% of them
reported that their perpetrator had been female
(Denov, 2003). In a study of male college
students, Fritz, Stoll and Wagner (1981) found
that 60% of the male students who reported
being sexually abused as children reported that
the perpetrator was a female. Taken together,
these and other researchers suggest that females
may account for approximately half of the
perpetrators of sexual abuse against male
victims.
There are misconceptions that
individuals hold as well about children who are
sexually abused. Individuals tend to deny that
sex between an adult and an older child
constitutes abuse. Child sexual abuse is often
seen as less abusive when a victim is an
adolescent than when a victim is a prepubescent child (Maynard & Wiederman,
1997). Sex of the child also plays a role in
whether a child or an adult is held responsible
for the sexual encounter. Sexual interactions
between a male child and a female perpetrator
are seen as less abusive than are sexual
interactions between a female child and a male
perpetrator (Maynard & Wiederman, 1997).
Misconceptions about prevalence and
harmfulness of child sex abuse may be related
to the fact that perceptions of sexual abuse do
not reflect the actual incidence of sexual abuse.
Finkelhor, Hotaling, Lewis and Smith (1990)
conducted a national survey collecting data on
child sexual abuse. A random sampling was
conducted through phone interviews in which
individuals were asked about their views on and

experiences with child sexual abuse. Of the
1,145 men and 1,481 women that were
called, 16% of the men reported
experiencing child sexual abuse and 27% of
the women reported experiencing child
sexual abuse. The average age that males
reported being victims of child sexual abuse
was 9.9 years old. The average age that
females reported being victims of child
sexual abuse was 9.6 years old. Twenty-two
percent of the males and 23% of the females
who had been abused reported having been
abused before the age of 8 (Finkelor et al.,
1990).
However, the actual incidence of
sexual victimization of males may in fact be
even higher than that reflected in court and
medical records. Finkelhor et al. (1990)
found that 42% of males who had been
sexually abused had never previously
disclosed this fact to anyone. The higher
percentage of female victims than male
victims may be due both to a higher rate of
sexual abuse of females than males as well
as the underreporting by male victims that
reduces the prosecution of perpetrators
against male children.
Clearly there are many disparities
between the actual incidence of child sexual
abuse and the perceived incidence of child
sexual abuse. Additionally, perceptions of
perpetrators and victims of child sexual
abuse do not reflect the realities of these
situations. The percentage of sexual
molestation perpetrated by females is higher
than that estimated by individuals, and the
percentage of sexual molestation
perpetrated against males is higher than that
estimated by individuals. The consequences
of under estimating cases in which females
perpetrate and males are victimized lead to
inequitable treatment of perpetrators and
victims. Why then is it that individuals are
unable or unwilling to acknowledge cases
that involve female perpetrators and male
victims? One reason may be people’s
reliance upon stereotypes.

Stereotyping
Stereotyping is an act of grouping
people into categories based on characteristics
such as sex, age, and race (Hilton & von
Hippel, 1996). Inferences are then made about
an individual group member based on
preconceived notions of that group (Eagly &
Mladinic, 1989). Individuals categorize
members of groups based on a number of
different characteristics. Because perpetrators
and victims of child sexual abuse may be either
male or female, sex stereotyping may play a
significant role in how perpetrators and victims
of child sexual abuse are perceived. Males are,
for example, typically perceived as more
aggressive than are females (Prentice &
Carranza, 2002). An individual holding this
stereotype of males may assume that a male is
more likely to victimize a child. This individual
might then assume that a male teacher is guilty
of having victimized a child when a child
makes an accusation of having been molested
by a teacher.
There is a natural need to place people
into categories in the same way that people
place other objects into categories such as
knowing an object is a chair versus a car even if
all cars and chairs don’t look the same (Allport,
1957; See Fiske, 1998 for a review). Through
the use of categorization, an individual can
quickly determine the purpose of an object.
Likewise, through categorization or
stereotyping people, an individual can make
quick judgments about these people.
Individuals are not born holding specific
stereotypes. Instead individuals acquire
stereotypes by one of two means. Individuals
develop stereotypes from first hand experience
or from secondhand knowledge acquired from
other people (Thompson, Judd & Park, 2000).
Receiving information about another person or
group of people seems to have a stronger effect
of creating a stereotype than experiencing an
event first-hand. A person who hears an account
secondhand often has a stronger reaction to a
stereotype than a person who is recounting that
experience. A person hearing the story does not
have all of the facts from the experience, but is
instead basing judgments on the exclusively
negative information provided secondhand.

Thus a person hearing an account of an
event is more likely to stereotype
(Thompson et. al., 2000).
Stereotypes also have greater impact
when they are believed by a majority of an
in-group than when they are not believed by
a majority of an in-group (Thompson et. al.,
2000). An in-group is any group to which a
person belongs. People are more likely to
believe a stereotype when the stereotype
comes from a person in their in-group
(Thompson et. al., 2000).
One reason people perceive
members of a group as possessing the same
characteristic may be due to the out-group
homogeneity effect (See Fiske, 1998 for a
review). In contrast to an in-group, an outgroup is any group to which a person does
not belong. Differences in characteristics of
out-groups as compared with in-groups are
magnified and are relied upon to place
individuals into stereotyped categories (See
Fiske, 1998 for a review). In-group
members are seen as having diverse
characteristics while out-group members are
seen as having similar characteristics. This
view of out-group members as similar in
characteristics is known as the out-group
homogeneity effect (Thompson et. al.,
2000).
The ability to recognize one’s own
in-group can be very important to survival.
By placing people in categories, individuals
can rapidly decide whether another person
is or is not a part of their in-group (See
Fiske, 1998 for a review). Thus,
categorizing people becomes an automatic
process (See Fiske, 1998 for a review).
When statements fit a participant’s
stereotype they can quickly make a
judgment about the statements. The
advantage then of using stereotypes is that
stereotyping reduces mental workload (See
Fiske, 1998 for a review). Stereotypes allow
people to focus on other items in their
surroundings without having to deliberate
over the intentions, qualifications, or
attitudes of other people who are present
(See Fiske, 1998 for a review).

Stereotyping includes several different
cognitive processes including information
processing, memory, perceptions, judgments,
and behaviors (see Fiske, 1998 for a review).
Individuals utilize previously acquired
information that has been assimilated into
categories (e.g., sex, race, age) to make sense of
newly acquired information (Macrae &
Bodenhausen, 2000). When exposed to a new
person or object, individuals rely upon their
established stereotypes or categories to make
judgments about a new person or object (Hilton
& von Hippel, 1996). Individuals might, for
example, hold a stereotype of women as
communal, nurturing, and kind. When
individuals encounter a woman they have not
met before, individuals may perceive and judge
this woman’s behavior to be communal,
nurturing, and kind. Individuals are inclined to
attend to, perceive, and categorize behaviors
about a person that are consistent with their
stereotypes (see Fiske, 1998 for a review).
Individuals relying upon stereotypes are
inclined to attend to stereotype confirming
information about a person and disregard
stereotype disconfirming information about a
person (See Fiske, 1998 for a review). People
are then seen as more similar to a stereotype
than they may in fact be because individuals fail
to process individual differences (Hilton & von
Hippel, 1996). Individuals, for example, may
tend to focus on an individual woman’s
nurturing behavior because nurturing behavior
is consistent with their stereotype of women as
nurturing. Individuals also tend to disregard
information that is inconsistent with their
stereotype. Individuals, for example, may tend
to ignore an individual woman’s harsh behavior
because harsh behavior is inconsistent with
their stereotype of women as nurturing. By
attending to stereotype consistent information
and failing to process stereotype inconsistent
information, individuals’ stereotypes are
reinforced. The nurturing stereotype of women,
for example, may become increasingly enduring
(See Fiske, 1998 for a review).
Individuals relying upon stereotypes are
not only inclined to attend to stereotype
consistent information more readily than
stereotype inconsistent information, but they are

also inclined to process stereotype
consistent information more easily than
stereotype inconsistent information.
Individuals presented with stereotype
inconsistent information need to utilize
cognitive effort to make sense of that
information. They may discount or
somehow alter the meaning of stereotype
inconsistent information (Hilton & von
Hippel, 1996). Confronted with a man who
is tearful, for example, an individual may
discount the possibility that this man is
crying (i.e., being emotional) and assume
this man has something in his eye. By so
doing, an individual has made stereotype
inconsistent information (i.e., an emotional
man) stereotype consistent (i.e., an injured
man).
Just as individuals relying upon
stereotypes are inclined to attend to and
process information differently, individuals
relying upon stereotypes may recall
information differently (see Fiske, 1998 for
a review). Individuals relying on stereotypes
recall stereotype consistent information
more easily than they recall stereotype
inconsistent information (Hilton & von
Hippel, 1996). Suppose, for example,
individuals held a stereotype of soccer
coaches as demanding, loud, aggressive,
and insensitive. If these individuals
witnessed the interactions between a soccer
coach and his team they might recall
instances in which a coach yelled at his
players on the field and might fail to recall
instances in which a coach was consoling a
player. In other words, a coach yelling is
consistent with stereotypes about soccer
coaches and therefore is recalled. A coach
consoling a player is inconsistent with
stereotypes about soccer coaches and
therefore is not recalled.
Individuals also rely upon
stereotypes when making judgments about
people (see Fiske, 1998 for a review).
Because individuals relying upon
stereotypes process and recall stereotype
consistent rather than stereotype
inconsistent information when faced with a
new person, individuals will make

stereotypic judgments about a new person.
Individuals, for example, when witnessing from
afar a soccer coach consoling a female player
may be more inclined to attribute this coach’s
behavior to inappropriate intimacy with the
child (i.e., a stereotype consistent behavior)
rather than to attempts to comfort the child (i.e.,
a stereotype inconsistent behavior).
Individuals also rely on stereotypes
when determining how to behave with other
people (see Fiske, 1998 for a review).
Individuals relying upon stereotypes make
judgments about out-group members that justify
discriminatory behavior. People who are
stereotyped are therefore frequently the targets
of discrimination. Because individuals may
stereotype an adolescent boy as obsessed with
sex, for example, they may judge an adolescent
boy who has been involved sexually with his
teacher as being a willing participant rather than
victimized by an adult. They may then justify
their discriminatory behavior in failing to
intervene or report this case of sexual abuse. By
engaging in these prejudicial judgments and
discriminatory behaviors, individuals are able to
“dismiss, ignore, or otherwise detach
themselves from the targets of these attitudes
and actions” (Snyder & Miene, 1994, p. 47). In
other words, prejudice and discrimination serve
as detachment functions.
Stereotypes that are specific to this
study of perceptions about sexual encounters
between an adult and adolescent involve sex
stereotypes. There are several stereotypes that
are generally believed about males. Males are
thought to be more agentic, competent,
adventurous, and independent than are females
(Deaux, 1995; Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). There
are also several stereotypes about females.
Females are thought to be more emotional,
communal, nurturing, and sentimental than are
males (Deaux, 1995; See Fiske, 1998 for a
review). Additional stereotypes that exist about
men and women are the perceptions that
women are kind but not competent while men
are seen as competent but perhaps not as kind
(See Fiske, 1998 for a review). Both men and
women are affected by these stereotypes in their
everyday lives. Women who choose roles that
do not fit stereotypical roles, such as being

housewives or being employed in typically
female jobs (e.g., nursing or teaching), are
often viewed negatively (See Fiske, 1998
for a review). Men who choose roles that do
not fit stereotypical roles, such as being the
breadwinner or being an athlete, are also
viewed negatively.
A person’s sex stereotypes may
affect views about perpetrators and victims
of child sexual abuse. A belief that males
are most often perpetrators and that girls are
most often victims is one way a person’s
sex stereotypes may influence attitudes
toward child sexual abuse (Maynard &
Wiederman, 1997). These stereotypes may
result in a person placing less blame on a
female perpetrator than on a male
perpetrator. Similarly, these stereotypes
may result in a person being less
sympathetic toward a male victim than
toward a female victim. There is also a
strong stereotypical belief that females do
not possess the potential to be sexually
aggressive. This belief may result in a lack
of prosecution of females who do commit
acts of child sexual abuse because law
officials believe females are unable to
commit such acts (Denov 2003).
Consequently, victims of a female
perpetrator are less likely to report sexual
abuse because they feel they will not be
believed.
Not all individuals rely upon
stereotypes to the same degree. Some
individuals are more likely to process
stereotype inconsistent information than are
others. One characteristic that may
influence reliance upon stereotypes is
individual differences in the need for
cognition.
Need for Cognition
Need for cognition is a person’s
tendency to participate in and enjoy
effortful thought (see Cacioppo, Petty
Feinstein & Jarvis, 1996 for a review).
Individuals who are high in need for
cognition tend to want to think longer about
a problem (Good, Hepper, HillenbrandGunn & Wang, 1995). They are inclined to

seek and critically evaluate information.
Individuals high in need for cognition also tend
to rely upon central cues (e.g., logic of a
message) when evaluating information (Perlini
& Hansen, 2001). Individuals who are low in
need for cognition tend to want to think as little
as possible (Good et al, 1995). They are not
inclined to seek and critically evaluate
information. Individuals low in need for
cognition also tend to rely upon peripheral or
superficial cues (e.g., attractiveness of a
message source) when evaluating information
(Perlini & Hansen, 2001).
Individuals high in need for cognition
are more likely to pay attention to the logic and
quality of an argument than are individuals low
in need for cognition. Conversely, individuals
low in need for cognition are more likely to pay
attention to heuristic cues than are individuals
high in need for cognition (e.g., Perlini &
Hansen, 2001). Need for cognition, for
example, is a strong indicator of whether males
will or will not believe rape myths. Males who
are low in need for cognition believe rape
myths more often than males who are high in
need for cognition (Good et al, 1995). Males
low in need for cognition would attend to such
heuristic cues as stereotypes of females as
provocative instigators of rape. Males high in
need for cognition would attend to such logical
arguments as no woman deserves to be raped.
This difference in attention may therefore
contribute to why males low in need for
cognition are more likely than males high in
need for cognition to believe myths about rape.
Individuals’ need for cognition
propensity affects how group opinions will alter
their attitudes as well (e.g., Areni, Ferrell,
&Wilcox, 2000). Group opinions are often
formed using non-complex arguments (Axsom,
Yates & Chaiken, 1987). Since many group
opinions are formed in this manner, group
opinions are more appealing to an individual
who is low in need for cognition than to an
individual high in need for cognition. An
individual who is low in need for cognition is
therefore likely to be swayed by the majority
opinion of a group. When group opinions are,
however, derived through complex analysis of a
situation, an individual high in need for

cognition may be swayed by the group
opinion (Areni et al., 2000). Individuals
who are high in need for cognition are more
likely to look for a complex explanation
than are individuals who are low in need for
cognition (Areni et al., 2000). For example,
an allegation of child sexual abuse is made
about a young male teacher of fourth
graders. In a PTA meeting a group of
parents, relying upon their stereotype of
males as sexually aggressive, wants to fire
the teacher without investigating the
allegations. Individuals in the PTA meeting
who are low in need for cognition are likely
to agree with this group decision that was
arrived at by relying upon heuristics.
Individuals high in need for cognition,
however, are likely to disagree with this
group decision and seek more information
that they can analyze.
In addition to the complexity of an
argument, individuals differing in need for
cognition are affected differently by the
quality of an argument (Cacioppo et al.,
1996). Individuals high in need for
cognition tend to enjoy thinking about and
analyzing an argument. They therefore
would be influenced by the quality of an
argument. Individuals low in need for
cognition tend to avoid thinking about and
analyzing an argument. They therefore
would not be influenced by the quality of an
argument. In fact, researchers have
consistently found a relationship between
need for cognition and argument quality
such that individuals high in need for
cognition are more affected by the quality
of a persuasive argument than are
individuals low in need for cognition (see
Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis 1996
for review). Individuals low in need for
cognition use less cognitive energy when
considering the merits of a recommendation
than do individuals high in need for
cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, &
Rodriguez, 1986). Individuals low in need
for cognition are therefore more likely to
rely upon stereotypes when considering the
merits of a recommendation. Recall the
previous example of the male teacher

accused of child sexual abuse. Suppose that the
child accusing this teacher has given
contradictory information that can easily be
refuted. Individuals low in need for cognition
are more likely than individuals high in need for
cognition to be persuaded by the discredited
argument because it fits their stereotypes that a
male is sexually aggressive. Individuals high in
need for cognition are less likely than
individuals low in need for cognition to be
persuaded by the discredited argument because
they will have enjoyed analyzing the argument.
In addition to being influenced
differently by the quality of an argument,
individuals high and low in need for cognition
are influenced differently by the source of an
argument (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Individuals
low in need for cognition are more likely than
are individuals high in need for cognition to
rely on news sources that require little cognitive
effort to process. Individuals low in need for
cognition, having heard a new law has been
passed requiring a background check for
virtually every person who enters a school, may
watch a television news cast to find out about
the purpose of the law. They would find out the
law was enacted in order for school officials to
make certain no construction workers or other
individuals working in proximity to the students
has a criminal history. The individuals low in
need for cognition might approve of the law
given the reported purpose of the law.
Individuals high in need for cognition, having
heard a new law has been passed requiring a
background check for virtually every person
who enters a school, may look for news
magazines and newspapers to read about the
purpose of the law. They would find out the law
was enacted in order for school official to make
certain no construction workers or other
individuals working in proximity to the students
has a criminal history. But they might also
analyze other factors such as the cost of the
required background checks, the limited access
to schools for parents who may not have had a
background check, the difficulty in enforcing
the law. Individuals high in need for cognition
might disapprove of the law because, having
analyzed the impact of the law, they might find
it impractical.

Individuals low in need for
cognition are more likely than individuals
high in need for cognition to rely on
peripheral cues such as trustworthiness,
attractiveness, or expertise of the source of
an argument (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984;
Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; Petty,
Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). When an
individual is presented with a trustworthy
source, that source is more likely to be
believed. Specifically people low in need
for cognition are more likely to believe an
honest, trustworthy source than an
untrustworthy source. Knowing that a
source is trustworthy allows a low in need
for cognition individual to believe an
argument without evaluating the quality of
an argument and relying solely on the
trustworthiness of that source thereby
expending minimal cognitive energy (e.g.,
Petty, Haugtvedt & Smith, 1995). When a
principal, for example, assures parents that a
teacher accused of child sexual abuse is not
a threat to students, individuals low in need
for cognition may be convinced that a
teacher is not a threat simply because
individuals low in need for cognition would
think that the principle is trustworthy and
therefore believable.
Individuals low in need for
cognition are also more likely to rely on
extrinsic persuasion cues than are
individuals high in need for cognition
(Axsom, et. al, 1987). Reliance on extrinsic
cues by individuals low in need for
cognition may be because extrinsic
persuasion cues require minimal cognitive
processing. In the domain of child sexual
abuse, an individual low in need for
cognition is likely to accept extrinsic
persuasion cues to evaluate what is
acceptable behavior (Axsom et al., 1987).
Some of these extrinsic cues may come
from cultural stereotypes. Males, for
example, are stereotypically viewed as
pursuers of females in sexual relationships.
Females are stereotypically viewed as the
object of males’ pursuits in sexual
relationships. By using cultural stereotypes,
an individual low in need for cognition may

conclude that males are more sexually
aggressive than are females.
Individuals low in need for cognition
tend to be disengaged from issues that do not
directly affect them. Individuals high in need
for cognition tend to be involved in issues that
do not directly affect them (Thompson &
Zanna, 1995). Consequently, individuals low in
need for cognition are particularly likely to rely
on peripheral cues when an issue being
considered is unrelated to them. In contrast,
individuals high in the need for cognition are
likely to focus on central cues when an issue
being considered is unrelated to them
(Thompson & Zanna, 1995). It would be
expected then that individuals high in need for
cognition would be more personally involved in
a social issue such as child sexual abuse than
would individuals low in need for cognition.
People differ in how they engage in
problem solving based on their need for
cognition (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984).
Individuals high in need for cognition enjoy
tasks that require them to think and to problem
solve. Individuals low in need for cognition
prefer tasks that do not require them to think
and to problem solve. Individuals high in need
for cognition also prefer complex rules and tend
to avoid activities that do not have complex
rules. Individuals low in need for cognition
prefer simple rules and tend to avoid activities
that do not have simple rules (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1984). Individuals high in need for
cognition also tend to engage in personal
problem solving more often than do individuals
low in need for cognition (Cacioppo et. al,
1986). Individuals high in need for cognition
are therefore more likely than individuals low
in need for cognition to consider how they can
address such complex social issues as child
sexual abuse even when this issue does not
directly affect them.
If individuals high in need for cognition
are engaged in issues, prefer complex
information, consider central cues, critically
analyze information, and in general expend
substantial cognitive effort, it is likely that they
also generate a significant number of thoughts
(Cacioppo et al., 1996). If individuals low in
need for cognition are disengaged in issues,

prefer simple information, consider
peripheral cues, avoid analyzing
information, and in general expend minimal
cognitive effort, it is likely that they also
generate a minimal number of thoughts
(Cacioppo et al., 1996). Individuals high in
need for cognition tend to generate more
thoughts as well as more task-relevant
thoughts after controlling for task-irrelevant
thoughts than do individuals low in need for
cognition (e.g., Lassiter, Briggs, & Slaw,
1991; Verplanken, 1993). It is likely then
that individuals high in need for cognition
would generate more thoughts than would
individuals low in need for cognition when
considering how to manage a case of
suspected child sexual abuse.
If individuals high in need for
cognition invest considerable cognitive
effort in processing and analyzing
information, then individuals high in need
for cognition would also be expected to
recall more information than would
individuals low in need for cognition. In
contrast, if individuals low in need for
cognition invest minimal cognitive effort in
processing and analyzing information, then
individuals low in need for cognition would
be expected to recall less information than
would individuals high in need for
cognition. In a meta-analysis, Cacioppo,
Petty, and colleagues determined that
individuals high in need for cognition did in
fact recall more of the information to which
they had been exposed than did individuals
low in need for cognition (Cacioppo et al.,
1996). Individuals high in need for
cognition in contrast to individuals low in
need for cognition would therefore be
expected to recall more information about
an incident of child sexual abuse.
If individuals high in need for
cognition expend substantial cognitive
energy processing and analyzing
information and they are also able to recall a
significant amount of this information, it
stands to reason that individuals high in
need for cognition would have an extensive
knowledge base. If individuals low in need
for cognition expend minimal cognitive

energy processing and analyzing information
and they are also able to recall a sparse amount
of this information, it stands to reason that
individuals low in need for cognition would
have a small knowledge base. When it comes to
politics, individuals high in need for cognition
were more knowledgeable about presidential
candidates (Cacioppo et al., 1986), more
knowledgeable about consequences of electing
specific candidates (Ahlering, 1987), and more
knowledgeable about reasons for supporting
specific candidates (Condra, 1992) than were
individuals low in need for cognition. Wolfe
and Grosch (1990) also found that individuals
high in need for cognition were better able to
perform on a trivia quiz than were individuals
low in need for cognition. It stands to reason
then that individuals high in need for cognition
will be more knowledgeable than individuals
low in need for cognition about other issues
such as child sexual abuse.
Given that individuals high in need for
cognition expend substantial cognitive effort
processing and analyzing information, rely on
central cues, and tend to have a broad
knowledge base about many issues, it is
reasonable to expect that individuals high in
need for cognition will make judgments based
on the recall and analysis of existing as well as
new information. In contrast, given that
individuals low in need for cognition expend
minimal cognitive effort processing and
analyzing information, rely upon peripheral
cues, and tend to have a small knowledge base
about many issues, it is reasonable to expect
that individuals low in need for cognition will
make judgments based on heuristics such as
stereotypes. In fact, judgments by individuals
high in need for cognition tend to be correlated
with thoughts generated by these individuals.
Judgments by individuals low in need for
cognition tend to be uncorrelated with thoughts
generated by these individuals (Haugtvedt,
Petty & Cacioppo, 1992). When considering a
social issue such as child sexual abuse,
individuals high in need for cognition would be
likely to have a broad knowledge base as well
as a desire to analyze information when making
judgments about a perpetrator, a victim, and an
interaction. In contrast, individuals low in need

for cognition would be likely to have a
small knowledge base as well as an aversion
to analyzing information when making
judgments about a perpetrator, a victim, and
an interaction. In other words, individuals
low in need for cognition would be more
likely to rely upon stereotypes when making
judgments about child sexual abuse than
would individuals high in need for
cognition.
Hypotheses
After reviewing the literature on
child sexual abuse, stereotyping, and the
need for cognition, several hypotheses were
proposed. First, participants were expected
to report more negative attitudes toward
male perpetrators than female perpetrators
of child sexual abuse. Second, participants
were expected to report more negative
attitudes toward male victims than female
victims of child sexual abuse. Third,
participants were expected to report less
negative attitudes toward a sexual encounter
between a female perpetrator and a male
victim than toward sexual encounters
between a male perpetrator and a male
victim, a male perpetrator and a female
victim, or a female perpetrator and a female
victim. Finally, differences in attitudes
toward perpetrators and victims of child
sexual abuse were expected to be moderated
by the participants’ individual differences in
need for cognition. In other words,
participants low in need for cognition were
expected to express more stereotypical
attitudes about perpetrators and victims of
child sexual abuse than were participants
high in need for cognition.
Method
Participants
One hundred and seven participants
were recruited to participate in an
experiment titled Adult-Adolescent Sexual
Encounters. Participants were recruited
through the psychology department from
undergraduate psychology classes.
Participants voluntarily signed up to
participate and were given a location and

time to appear. Participants were given an
opportunity to receive extra credit in their
courses for participating in this study. The only
restriction on participants was that they must
have been eighteen years old or older.
This sample of participants consisted of
69 female (64.5%) and 36 male (33.6%)
participants. Participants came from a range of
racial backgrounds including White/Caucasian
(72.9%), Black/African American (13.1%),
Hispanic/Latino (5.6%), Asian/Pacific Islander
(2.8%), or other (3.7%). The majority of
participants ranged in age from 18 to 24 years
(73.8%). Approximately 76% of participants
reported being single and never married.
Approximately 81% reported having no
children. Two participants failed to record any
demographic information.
Of the 107 people who participated in
this study, 107 completed the survey except for
two individuals who did not provide
demographic information. All participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions.
Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants. All participants were treated in
accordance with the guidelines of Ethical
Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct (American Psychological Association,
2002).
Procedure
Participants completed this study in
small groups of no more than ten individuals.
Participants were informed of the purpose of
this study as well as the possibility that they
might find the topics of this study emotionally
distressing. Participants were informed of
alternative means of earning extra credit and
their right to withdraw from the study at any
time without penalty. Participants were assured
of complete anonymity and confidentiality of
their responses. Participants’ questions were
answered to their satisfaction. Each participant
signed a written informed consent form that
was collected prior to distributing the surveys.
Participants were told that they would
read a scenario depicting a sexual interaction
between an adult and an adolescent and then
respond to statements about their perceptions of
this interaction and those people involved.

Participants were given one of four possible
scenarios depicting a scene involving an
eighth-grade adolescent (male or female)
and a teacher (male or female) in which the
adolescent was asked to perform and accept
sexual acts. An example of a scenario
involving a female victim and a female
perpetrator is as follows:
Mary, an eighth grader in Ms. Jones
class, stayed after school for help with
her homework. Ms. Jones asked Mary to
help stack some books in the closet.
While moving the books, Mary and Ms.
Jones began to talk. Ms. Jones told
Mary that she thought Mary was very
mature for her age. Ms. Jones said that
she thought Mary was very attractive.
The teacher placed her hand on Mary’s
leg and began rubbing Mary’s body.
Mary watched silently. Ms. Jones asked
Mary to lie down on the floor, telling
her she would enjoy this, that it would
feel good. Mary did nothing. The
teacher continued rubbing Mary’s body
and then slowly undressed her. When
Mary was naked, the teacher began
kissing Mary’s body, starting with
Mary’s face and working her way down
to Mary’s thighs. Ms. Jones performed
oral sex on Mary. Then the teacher sat
up and put Mary’s hand inside Ms.
Jones’ slacks and asked Mary to rub the
teacher’s body as the teacher had done
to her. Then the teacher undressed and
lay on top of Mary while she fondled
Mary’s buttocks. Ms. Jones brought
Mary’s face down to her crotch and
asked Mary to perform oral sex on the
teacher. Mary did as she was asked. Ms.
Jones fondled Mary’s genitals as she
continued to caress Mary’s body. Then
Ms. Jones got up and brought Mary her
clothes and asked her not to tell her
parents what had happened. The teacher
asked Mary that their relationship
remain their secret.
Participants were randomly assigned to
read one of four versions of a scenario in

which the sex of the adult and the sex of the
adolescent were manipulated: male adult/male
adolescent, female adult/male adolescent, male
adult/female adolescent, and female
adult/female adolescent.
Using a 5-point scale, participants then
responded to ten items from the semantic
differential (e.g., good/bad) (Osgood, Suci, &
Tannenbaum, 1957). Items were
counterbalanced such that for some items the
negative descriptor was on the right pole of the
scale and at other times the negative descriptor
was on the left pole of the scale. Scores for
responses on items with the negative descriptor
on the left were reverse scored so that higher
scores on an item reflected more negative
attitudes about the encounter. After reverse
scoring, scores were summed and higher total
scores reflected more negative attitudes than did
lower total scores. In this sample, a Cronbach’s
α of .80 was obtained in this study for scores on
items from the semantic differential scale.
After responding to statements about the
scenario, participants were given the 18-item
Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, &
Kao, 1984). Participants responded to items in
the scale with a 5-point Likert type scale:
strongly disagree, moderately disagree,
uncertain/undecided, moderately agree or
strongly agree. Included in the scale were both
negatively and positively worded statements.
Agreement with positively worded items
indicated a high need for cognition (e.g., “I
would prefer complex to simple problems”).
Disagreement with negatively worded items
indicated a high need for cognition (e.g., “I
prefer to think about small, daily projects to
long-term ones”).
Responses to statements where
disagreement with these statements indicated a
high need for cognition were reverse scored.
Scores for responses on individual items were
then summed and higher scores indicated a
higher need for cognition and lower scores
indicated a lower need for cognition.
Participants’ scores on the scale were
dichotomized into high and low using a median
split.
Using the 18-item Need for Cognition
Scale, Berzonsky and Sullivan (1992) found a

Cronbach’s alpha of .91 for scores on this
scale. Peltier and Schibrowsky (1994) found
a Cronbach’s alpha of .97 for scores on this
scale. Other researchers have found
Cronbach’s alphas of .87 or higher for
scores on this scale (e.g., Booth-Butterfeild
& Booth-Butterfeild, 1990; Furlong, 1993;
Kernis, Grannemann & Barclay, 1992). A
Cronbach’s alpha of .84 was found for
scores on this scale in this study.
Positive correlations have been
found between scores on the Need for
Cognition Scale and scores on scales of
other constructs of theoretical interest.
There are positive correlations between
scores on scales measuring individuals’
need for cognition and individuals’ high
aptitude for college performance (e.g.,
Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) individuals’ desire
for new experiences that stimulate thinking
(e.g., Pearson, 1970) and individuals’ low
apprehension regarding interpersonal
communication (e.g., Wheeless, 1975).
Correlations between scores on the Need for
Cognition Scale and scores on these
conceptually related scales are evidence of
construct validity for the Need for
Cognition Scale. Scores on the Need for
Cognition are not correlated with scores on
Bem Sex-Role Inventory (e.g., Waters &
Zakrajsek, 1990), scores on the Need for
Closure scale (e.g., Petty & Jarvis, 1996)
and scores on the Need to Evaluate scale
(e.g., Jarvis & Petty, 1996). The lack of
correlation between scores on the Need for
Cognition Scale and scores on these
conceptually unrelated scales are evidence
of discriminant validity for the Need for
Cognition Scale.
A series of manipulation checks
were included on the questionnaire to
ascertain whether participants correctly
recalled the sex of the victim (Mark or
Mary) and the sex of the perpetrator (Mr.
Jones or Mrs. Jones) in the scenario they
were given. Participants were also asked a
series of demographic questions (e.g., age,
race, marital status) as well as whether or
not they had any children. Participants were
also asked questions about their own

experiences with child sexual abuse.
Participants were asked three questions about
their own sexual experiences before age 16 with
any individual five or more years their senior
(e.g., Another person, five or more years older
than you, attempted oral sex, anal sex or vaginal
intercourse.).
Participants placed their completed
answer sheets in an envelope to ensure total
anonymity. Envelopes were then placed in a
box away from the researcher. Participants
received a debriefing sheet that provided them
with information about on campus and after
hour counseling services in the event that
material from this study resulted in emotional
distress for the participants.

Results

Preliminary Analyses
Descriptive Statistics. We performed
a preliminary analysis of the data to obtain
the mean, standard deviation, and range of
scores for each of the measures (see Table
1). We evaluated scores on each of the
measures for skewness and kurtosis. Scores
on the Need for Cognition Scale had
skewness and kurtosis coefficients near zero
indicating that scores on this scale did not
violate assumptions of normality
(Marcoulides & Hershberger, 1997). Scores
on the ad-hoc measure of attitudes toward
child molestation had skewness coefficient
of -2.44 and kurtosis coefficient of 8.11
indicating that the scores on this scale did
violate assumptions of normality. For this
ad-hoc measure, the minimum possible
score was 10 and the maximum possible
score was 50. Actual scores for the scale
were a minimum of 13 and a maximum of
50. The possible range of scores was 40,
while actual range of scores was 37.

Table 1
Descriptive statistics for independent and dependent measures
________________________________________________________________________
Scale

M

SD

Skewness

Kurtosis

Need for Cognition

60.94

9.80

-.14

.29

Semantic Differential

44.24

6.05

-2.44

8.11

Chi Square Analysis. We computed
analyses for measures of Need for Cognition
and sex of participant to determine if there was
multicolinearity. Scores on the Need for
Cognition scale were not significantly related to
sex of participant, χ2<1, p not significant.
Scores on the Need for Cognition Scale were
not confounded with sex of the participant.

Manipulation Check. At the
conclusion of the study, we asked
participants to recall the sex of the adult and
the sex of the adolescent in the scenario at
the beginning of the study. If in fact the
manipulation of sex of perpetrator and sex
of victim was effective, we expected
participants to recall the sex of the
perpetrator and the sex of the victim
correctly. Participants did in fact recall and
record the sex of the perpetrator correctly

94% of the time and the sex of the victim
correctly 94% of the time indicating that the
manipulation of perpetrator and victim sex were
effective.
Main Analysis
The predictor variable was need for
cognition as measured by the Need for
Cognition Scale (high vs. low). Other
independent variables were sex of perpetrator
(male vs. female) and sex of victim (male vs.
female). This study was therefore a 2 (high vs.
low need for cognition) x 2 sex of perpetrator
(male vs. female) x 2 sex of victim (male vs.
female) factorial design. The criterion
(dependent) variable was attitudes toward child
molestation as measured by the semantic
differential scale. An alpha level of .05 was
used for all statistical analyses.
Recall the first hypothesis. Participants
would perceive male perpetrators more harshly
than female perpetrators. That is, participants
would express more negative attitudes about
male perpetrators than female perpetrators.
There was not, however, a main effect for sex
of perpetrator on attitudes towards child sexual
abuse, F(1,106) = 1.49, p > .05. Therefore,
there was no support for the first hypothesis.
According to the second hypothesis,
participants would perceive male victims more
harshly than female victims. That is,
participants would express more negative
attitudes toward male victims than female
victims. There was not, however, a main effect
for sex of victim, F(1,106) < 1.00, p > .05.
Therefore, there was no support for the second
hypothesis.
In the third hypothesis, participants were
predicted to view a sexual encounter between a
female adult and a male adolescent less
negatively than other dyads. There was an
interaction of sex of perpetrator and sex of
victim such that the encounter between the
female perpetrator and male victim were
viewed less negatively than were the other three
dyads, F(1,106) = 3.33, p < .07 (see Table 2).

Therefore, there was support for the third
hypothesis.
Table 2. Attitudes Toward Sexual
Interaction

Perpetrator/Victim
Female/Female
Female/Male
Male/Female
Male/Male

M
45.07
41.70
44.27
45.85

SD
4.06
8.18
6.14
4.41

Finally, the effect of sex of
perpetrator and sex of victim was expected
to be influenced by participants’ need for
cognition. That is, individuals low in need
for cognition were expected to report more
negative attitudes towards male perpetrators
than were individuals high in need for
cognition. Individuals low in need for
cognition were also expected to report more
negative attitudes toward male victims than
were individuals high in need for cognition.
Additionally, individuals low in need for
cognition were expected to report less
negative attitudes toward a female adult and
male adolescent sexual encounter than were
individuals high in need for cognition.
There was a three way interaction
between sex of perpetrator, sex of victim,
and need for cognition of participant,
F(1,106) = 3.53, p < .06 (see Figure 1).
Participants low in need for cognition did
not, however, express more negative
attitudes overall about male perpetrators
than did participants high in need for
cognition. Participants low in need for
cognition and participants high in need for
cognition expressed nearly equal negative
attitudes about male and female victims.
Participants low in need for cognition did,
however, express less negative attitudes
about female perpetrators with male victims
than did participants high in need for
cognition.

High and Low Need for Cognition and Attitudes Toward Sexual Interactions by
Perpetrator/Victim Dyads
48
46
44

Low Need for
Cognition

42

High Need for
Cognition

40
38
36
34
Female/Female

Female/Male

Male/Female

Male/Male

Sex of Perpetrator and Sex of Victim

Figure 1. Mean attitude scores for high and low need for cognition participants as a function
of perpetrator and victim dyads.

Discussion
In the first hypothesis, it was predicted that
male perpetrators would be perceived more
negatively than female perpetrators, this
prediction was not supported. Males are
stereotypically seen as more aggressive than are
females. Crimes in which behaviors are
stereotypical (e.g., males are more aggressive)
are typically perceived as more likely to reoccur
and more deserving of harsh punishment than
are behaviors that are not stereotypical
(Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985). Due to the
nature of the sexual encounter in this current
study, participants may not have relied on this
stereotype when assessing their attitudes
towards child sexual abuse. Participants may
view a sexual encounter as less of an aggressive
act than they would view other types of assault.
Participants may instead view a sexual assault
as more of a consensual act than an act of
aggression. If so, then participants would be
less inclined to rely on their stereotypes of
males as aggressive than if the encounter had
been physical assault. In some previous studies,
researchers have found attributions of
responsibility for sexual molestation were not
influenced by the sex of the perpetrator of
sexual molestation (Maynard & Weiderman,
1997).

In the second hypothesis it was
predicted that participants would perceive
male victims more negatively than female
victims. This hypothesis was also not
supported. Previously, researchers have
obtained mixed results for the effect of sex
of victim on attitudes toward victims.
Female victims have been stereotyped as
provocative instigators of their victimization
deserving of both sympathy and partial
responsibility (Glaser, 1993; Howard,
1984). In contrast, male victims have been
stereotyped as sexual aggressors in sexual
encounters deserving more of responsibility
than sympathy (Malamuth, Sockloskie,
Koss & Tanaka, 1991; Koss, Gidycz &
Wisniewski, 1987). It is possible that some
participants relied upon their stereotypes of
males as aggressive and other participants
relied upon their stereotypes of females as
instigators. Consequently, the effect of the
stereotypes may not have been apparent in
this study because the two effects may have
canceled one another out. In order to
capture participants’ reliance upon these
opposing stereotypes, it would be helpful to
have participants record their impressions of
those victims.

The third hypothesis was supported in
that sexual interactions between a female
perpetrator and male victim were perceived less
negatively than were sexual interactions
between a male perpetrator and female or male
victim as well as a female perpetrator and a
female victim. In general, people tend to view a
sexual interaction between a female adult and
male adolescent as not being detrimental to that
“victim” (Broussard, Wagner, & Kazelskis,
1991). An encounter between a female adult
and a male adolescent is typically not viewed as
abusive (Maynard & Wiederman, 1997). The
widely accepted attitude toward a female adult
and male adolescent sexual interaction is
consistent with cultural stereotypes in that early
sexual behavior for males is condoned where as
early sexual behavior for females is condemned
(Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 1991).
The fourth hypothesis received partial
support in that low need for cognition
participants’ attitudes about the sexual
interaction were influenced by the sex of
perpetrator and sex of victim whereas high need
for cognition participants’ attitudes about the
sexual interaction were not influenced by the
sex of the perpetrator and the sex of the victim.
Specifically, participants low in need for
cognition viewed a sexual interaction between a
female perpetrator and a male victim less
negatively than they did sexual interactions
between a male perpetrator and a male or a
female victim as well as a sexual interaction
between a female perpetrator and a female
victim. In contrast, participants high in need for
cognition viewed a sexual interaction between a
female perpetrator and a male victim equally
negatively as sexual interactions between a
male perpetrator and a male or a female victim
as well as a sexual interaction between a female
perpetrator and a female victim.
Limitations
Although there was no support for the
first two hypotheses, results of this study could
have been influenced in part by the sample.
Participants may have been different from the
general population in that participants were
from a sample of college students. Because of
their desire to become educated, individuals

attending college might be expected to be
higher in need for cognition than individuals
in the general population. College students
involved in education must engage in
cognitive endeavors in order to succeed.
Consequently, a sample of college students
may be higher in need for cognition than
people in general. It is unlikely that
differences in college student’s need for
cognition and general populations need for
cognition, if they do exist, had an effect in
this study because a median split was used
to dichotomize those individuals’ scores in
need for cognition. Consequently,
differences in need for cognition were
relative to this sample.
The results of this study could also
have been influenced by the effectiveness of
the manipulations. Sex of the perpetrator
was subtly manipulated by changing only
the form of address (i.e., Mr. or Ms.)
Perhaps participants did not comprehend
that the adult in the scenario was a male
(Mr. Jones) or a female (Ms. Jones). Sex of
the victim was subtly manipulated by
changing the name of the adolescent (i.e.,
Mark or Mary) Perhaps participants did not
comprehend that the adolescent in the
scenario was a male (Mark) or a female
(Mary). This explanation is, however, also
unlikely because 94% of the participants
recalled and reported the sex of the
perpetrator and the sex of the victim in the
scenarios correctly.
Additionally, the results of the study
could have been influenced by the measures
employed. All of the measures used in the
study were self-report instruments and were
therefore subject to influences of social
desirability. No identifying information
was, however, recorded on any of the
responses. Participants were assured of
confidentiality (i.e., that no individual
responses but only aggregate data would be
reported). Participants, upon completing the
surveys, inserted their responses into a plain
brown envelope and deposited them in a
box. It is therefore unlikely that participants
felt they needed to answer in socially
desirable ways because participants’

responses were anonymous and confidential.
The Need for Cognition scale has
previously been shown to be a reliable and valid
measure (see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, &
Jarvis 1996 for a review). In the current study,
scores on the Need for Cognition scale
appeared to be internally consistent as well.
Consequently, it is unlikely that the way in
which need for cognition was measured
influenced the results of the study.
The ad hoc measure of the dependent
variable included a scenario modeled after a
scenario that had been employed in a previous
study (Maynard & Wiederman, 1997). Attempts
were made to use a measure that already had
been validated, but it was necessary to alter the
scenario slightly to capture the information
needed in this study. It is possible that the
scenario did not depict a plausible sexual
encounter between an adult and an adolescent.
This is, however, unlikely because the
responses to items about the scenario resulted in
nearly a full range of scores.
The ad hoc measure of the dependent
variable, consisting of ten items from the
semantic differential scale, was created
specifically for this study. Therefore, the
measure used may not have been valid. Scores
on the ad hoc measure of attitudes toward child
molestation were, however, internally
consistent. It is therefore unlikely that the way
in which attitudes toward child sexual abuse
was measured influenced the results of the
study.
Future Directions
In the current study the sex of the
perpetrator and the sex of the victim were
manipulated. A number of other characteristics
of perpetrators and victims as well as
characteristics of their relationship may
influence people’s perceptions of sexual abuse.
Maynard and Weiderman (1997) noted that
individuals are more likely to blame a fifteenyear-old victim than a seven-year-old victim.
Additional research exploring the impact of the
age of the victim on attitudes would be
valuable. Other characteristics such as race of
perpetrators and victims, sexual orientation of
perpetrators, and socio-economic status of

perpetrators and victims may also warrant
investigation.
Characteristics of the relationship
between perpetrators and victims may also
be valuable topics for future research.
Parents are most often perpetrators of child
physical abuse (Gelles & Straus, 1988).
Individuals may therefore believe that
parents are most often the perpetrators of
sexual abuse. Individuals’ perceptions of
child sexual abuse may also influenced by
media attention focused on cases in which
strangers have abducted and sexually
assaulted children. It would therefore be
important to examine the influence of the
relationship between perpetrators and
victims on people’s perceptions of child
sexual abuse.
Severity of the sexual abuse (e.g.,
use or threat of force, penetration) has been
shown by other researchers to impact the
victim (Kendall-Tackett et al., 1993).
Perhaps individuals would have different
attitudes toward perpetrators and victims of
severe sexual abuse versus victims of
moderate or mild sexual abuse. Future
research examining the influence of abuse
severity on people’s perceptions of victims
and perpetrators may therefore be valuable.
In addition to the influences of
characteristics of perpetrators and victims as
well as situational factors, individual
differences in perceivers may impact
attitudes toward child sexual abuse. In this
study, research was centered on the
individual difference in participants’ need
for cognition. Differences in need for
cognition did influence perceptions of child
sexual abuse in this study. Other individual
difference variables may also be related to
participants’ attitude towards child sexual
abuse. Need for closure, for example, is a
persons preference for order, predictability,
and lack of ambiguity (Leone, Wallace &
Modglin, 1999; Neuberg, Judice & West,
1997;Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
Individuals with a high need for closure
desire stability and want knowledge to be
consistent across situations and time
(Webster& Kruglanski, 1994). A person

who is high in need for closure is likely to be
“closed minded” (Webster & Kruglanski,
1994). This closed mindedness may be related
to strong preconceived notions about what is
and isn’t child sexual abuse, which may in turn
be related to individuals’ attitudes towards child
sexual abuse.
Recall the cases of Jessica Lunsford and
Elizabeth Smart. Now in contrast consider the
following cases. Mary Kay Letourneau, an
attractive middle-aged woman, was arrested and
convicted of second-degree child rape and
sentenced to seven years in prison only to have
that sentence suspended. She managed to have
two children with her adolescent victim. Or
consider the case of Debra LaFave, a middle
school reading teacher and former model, who
was charged with lewd and lascivious battery
and lewd and lascivious exhibition after
repeatedly having sex with a fourteen-year-old
student. School representatives expressed
concern that because LaFave is pretty, her
young male student will not be seen as a victim
(CBS News, 2005). Her defense attorneys plan
to use an insanity defense and justify her
behavior by portraying her as depressed and ill
since her older sister’s death a few years earlier
(CBS News, 2003). It is hard to imagine that a
case in which a middle-aged man had sex
repeatedly with a child and bore two children
with her would have resulted in a seven-year
sentence. It is even harder to imagine a male
schoolteacher having sex with his student
would consider an insanity defense because of
depression.
Whether because of the stereotypes
people hold or because of individual differences
that are related to the use of stereotypes,
healthcare professionals, law enforcement
officials, and other individuals charged with
protecting children do not handle cases of child
sexual abuse equitably (Ajdukovic, Petak, &
Mrsic, 1993; Elliott, Tong, & Tan, 1997;
Marshall & Locke, 1997). This inequitable
treatment leads to a lack of protection for
children who become victims of child sexual
abuse. Understanding why people treat cases of
child sexual abuse in inequitable manners may
help to change societal norms that will help

protect children from continuing to endure
this heinous crime.
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